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Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for wholesale elec-
tricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and coordinate new investment. In the
medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers and demanders lock in energy prices and quan-
tities for one to three years. In the long term, a forward reliability market assures adequate resources are
available when they are needed most. The forward markets reduce risk for both sides of the market, since
they reduce the quantity of energy that trades at the more volatile spot price. Spot market power is
mitigated by putting suppliers and demanders in a more balanced position at the time of the spot
market. The markets also reduce transaction costs and improve liquidity and transparency. Recent
innovations to the Colombia market illustrate the basic elements of the forward markets and their
beneﬁcial role.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Electricity market design seeks to satisfy consumers’ demand
for electricity at minimum cost. This requires both short-run efﬁ-
ciencydthe operation of existing resources at minimum costdand
long-run efﬁciencydinvestment in the right quantity and mix of
resources. Both goals are made difﬁcult by features of electricity
markets. Supplyand demand must be balanced at every instant and
at every location. The physical constraints of the network must be
respected. And demand often is unresponsive to spot price
ﬂuctuations.
Our thesis is that the goals of electricity market design are better
met when the spot market is complemented with two forward
markets,onemediumtermandonelongterm.Awell-designedspot
market is necessary for efﬁciency, but is not sufﬁcient. Efﬁciency
requires that issues of risk, market power, and investment be
addressed. The two forward markets address risk by enabling the
market participants to lock in prices and quantities, limiting expo-
suretothemorevolatile spotmarket.Marketpowerisaddressedby
putting participants in a more balanced position entering the spot
market, mitigating the incentive to distort bids. Finally, the long-
termmarketcoordinatesinvestmentinnewresources,assuringthat
adequate resources will be available when they are most needed.
The California electricity crisis of 2000e2001 illustrates all too
well the problems that can arise when one relies excessively on the
spot market. Key conditions of the crisis were insufﬁcient forward
contracting and tight supply. During this prolonged period of tight
supply, the unhedged demanders were exposed to sustained high
spot prices. Suppliers, also positioned without forward contracts,
had strong incentives to exercise market power further exacer-
bating the high prices. The load serving entities, despite initially
being well capitalized, ultimately teetered toward bankruptcy and
the market collapsed.
The proposed forward markets would have reduced or perhaps
prevented the crisis. To the extent that the crisis was caused by
inadequate resources, the long-term market would assure sufﬁ-
cient investment to relieve the tight supply conditions that
contributed to high prices. Even if spot prices became high for an
extended period, with the forward markets the vast majority of the
quantity would be transacted at sustainable forward prices, pre-
venting the large wealth transfers that pushed utilities toward
bankruptcy. Finally, suppliers in roughly balanced positions
entering the spot market would have much reduced incentives to
exercise market power, so the behavior of the spot market would
have likely been less extreme.
Our view is that forward markets can address three of the
pressing problems in current wholesale markets: investment, risk,
and market power.
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The need for forward markets and the form that they take will
depend on the setting. We use Colombia to illustrate one approach
to the forward markets. Colombia recently adopted both a long-
term market and a medium-term market. Similar markets have
been adopted in parts of the U.S., such as New England. We present
the essential features of each market and discuss some of the
design choices. We begin with the long-term market and then
discuss the medium-term market.
The need for regulated forward markets in electricity comes
largely from market failures on the demand side. Consumer
demand response is limited; consumers have limited exposure to
spot prices and have no ability to express preferences for reliability.
As a result, in most markets, regulators establish the quantity of
resources needed. The long-term market assures that adequate
resources exist and establishes a transparent competitive process
for identifying and pricing these resources. Regulation of medium-
term (1e3 year) markets may be justiﬁed to avoid self-dealing by
vertically integrated distribution companies, to address market
power, and to reduce transaction costs.
2. Long-term: the forward reliability market for investment
Forward reliability markets now operate in Colombia and New
England. These markets coordinate investment in new resources to
assure that adequate resources are available when they are needed
most. The two markets have the same basic features, although they
differ in the deﬁnition of the reliability product.
1
A fundamental characteristic of the Colombian electricity
market is that it is hydro-dominated. Roughly 80% of Colombia’s
energy is produced from hydro resources, and about two-thirds of
its capacity is hydro.As a result,the resource adequacyconstraint in
Colombia is having sufﬁcient thermal resources and hydro reser-
voirs to provide energy during severe dry periods. Thus, Colombia
has a “ﬁrm energy market” to assure resource adequacy, where the
product (ﬁrm energy) is the ability to produce energy during severe
dry periods.
By contrast, New England is a thermal-dominated system. The
resource adequacy constraint is having sufﬁcient resources to serve
the annual peak. The reliability product is capacitydthe ability to
produce energy during a hot summer day. Thus, New England has
a capacity market.
In both Colombia and New England, the regulator establishes
the overall resource requirement and determines the individual
contribution toward this requirement of each resource. For
example, in Colombia each hydro unit (and thermal unit) is rated
based on its expected energy output in a severe dry season. The
system operator then procures on behalf of load enough ﬁrm
energy to satisfy the requirement.
The ﬁrst question is why have a forward reliability market.
A main motivation is coordinating investment in new resources to
assure resource adequacy. The absence of demand response is
another factor. Spot prices tend to be too low during scarcity, either
because of price caps or operator decisions, such as voltage
reductions, which impact price. The forward reliability market
reduces risk and addresses market power, while assuring that
investment incentives are strong enough for efﬁcient entry.
Issuesof risk andinvestment incentives areespecially important
in Colombia. As a result of El Nino phenomena, sustained scarcity
events from lack of rainfall occur about once every ten years. An
investor is unlikely to build a thermal peaking unit anticipating the
energy proﬁts during these severe dry periods. These events,
occurring perhaps two months in ten years, are simply too infre-
quent. The investment would entail too much risk. The reliability
market provides a constant revenue stream in exchange for the
obligation to provide energy at more moderate prices during
scarcity events. Risk is dramatically reduced for the investor
(Cramton et al., 2006). Risk is also reduced for the demand side,
which is important in Colombia where the demand side cannot
tolerate large and sustained price shocks. Finally, demand is
growing rapidly in Colombia, so new investment is essential.
Previous to the ﬁrm energy market, Colombia generators
received a reliability payment, but this payment was set adminis-
tratively. The new market selects new projects and establishes the
payment through a transparent competitive process.
A main feature of the design is that the procurement occurs well
in advance of the commitment period. This allows new projects to
compete in advance of entry, before signiﬁcant costs are sunk,
which increases competition and produces a meaningful price. It
also allows for coordinated entry, reducing the boom-and-bust
cycles that frequently occur in the construction of new power
plants.
The coordinated entry reduces the uncertainty in achieving the
target level of resources. Some over-procurement will occur as
aresultof thelumpiness of investment and mistakenloadforecasts,
but it is not necessary to deliberately procure extra resources in
recognition of uncertain entry.
A further advantage of forward procurement is that new
resources set the ﬁrm energy price directly. Foreclosure of the
market is prevented with limits on excessive concentration of
supply.
With forward procurement, it is possible to make a long-term
commitment for new resources. This reduces investor risk and
sends a price signal for new investment that is directly related to
the cost of new entry.
The ﬁrm energy product is a ﬁnancial call option backed by
a physical resource rated by the regulator as capable of producing
a particular level of energy during a severe dry period. The physical
requirement guarantees that sufﬁcient resources will be available
to produce energy. The ﬁnancial call option hedges load from high-
energy prices during periods of scarcity.2
Bundling the physical resource to the product is essential. This
assures adequate physical resources and enables the market to
restore the “missing money” in the energy market, caused by too-
low energy prices as a result of prices caps or operator actions
during scarcity. Because of this missing money, the clearing price in
the ﬁrm energy market exceeds the ﬁnancial cost of the call option.
The supplier’s generating units and fuel provide a physical
hedge to limit the risk of selling the call option. Indeed, relative to
an energy-only market, the supplier’s risk is reduced, since the ﬁrm
energy market substitutes highly variable energy rents with
a constant ﬁrm energy payment.
The supplier’s obligation is load following in aggregate: in each
hour the total obligation is equal to load. A supplier’s obligation in
any day is equal to its share of ﬁrm energy. The obligation is
distributed over the day based on the supplier’s hourly dispatch.
This deﬁnitiondtying a unit’s obligation to its hourly dispatch
during scarcitydreduces supplier deviations. A baseload unit’s
obligation is spread throughout the day; a hydro unit with high
opportunity cost has its obligation concentrated on the peak hours
of the day.
1 See Cramton and Stoft (2008) for a general analysis of forward reliability
markets. Cramton and Stoft (2007) focus on the Colombia design; and Cramton
(2006) focuses on the New England design.
2 Many papers have suggested the use of call options. See Bidwell (2005),
Vazquez et al. (2002), Chao and Wilson (2004), Cramton and Stoft (2006, 2007,
2008), and Oren (2005).
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A desirable variation is to base the obligation on expected load,
rather than actual load. This reduces supplier risk and improves
incentives for demand response.
The strike price of the call option, called the scarcity price, is set
at a high heat-rate times a gas index plus other non-fuel variable
costs. The intent is for the scarcity price to be above the marginal
cost of all thermal units. Although a lower scarcity price may
further reduce price risk, the scarcity price is set high to allow
energy contracting outside of the long-term market, for example in
bilateral contracts or the medium-term market described in the
next section.
The auction is conducted four or more years in advance of the
commitment period. New resources lock in a ﬁrm energy price for
up to twenty years.3 Existing resources receive the price set by new
entry each year. All resources, both new and existing, are paid the
same ﬁrm energy price. Moreover, this price is the same for all
locations and for all types of resources. In markets with binding
transmission constraints, the reliability market may have zonal
prices that reﬂect the differing value of resources in different zones,
and the price is then the same for all types of resources at all
locations within a given zone.
The auction uses a descending-clock format.4 The price starts
at a high price, about twice the estimated cost of new entry.
Suppliers respond with the quantity each is willing to supply at
that price. If there is excess supply, the price is reduced and the
suppliers again specify the quantity desired at the lower price.
This process continues until a price is reached in which supply
and demand are balanced. This deﬁnes the clearing price, which
is paid to all winning bidders throughout their commitment
periods.
The quantity of ﬁrm energy demanded increases slightly as the
price falls. Additional ﬁrm energy beyond the target has value for
consumers, but this marginal value declines fairly rapidly. The
demand curve has both a price ceiling and a price ﬂoor. The price
ceiling at twotimes the estimated cost of new entry (CONE) reﬂects
the fact that entry at high prices is not limited by the price incen-
tive, but rather other non-price constraints. The price ﬂoor at one-
half CONE is intended to prevent the ﬁrm energy price from falling
too low in times of surplus. This provides stability to the ﬁrm
energy price, which reduces supplier risk and thus reduces
consumer cost in the long term.
The descending-clock auction includes important price forma-
tion features. First, to promote price discovery, there is an activity
rule that requires each supplier’s offers to be consistent with an
upward-sloping supply curve; that is, as the price declines
a supplier can only maintain or decrease its supply. Second, to
prevent the exercise of market power byexisting suppliers, existing
supply can opt out of the market, but this choice is not allowed to
impact the price paid to existing suppliers.
Performance incentives are provided primarily via the spot
market. To the extent that the supplier provides more than its
obligation, it is rewarded by the spot energy price; to the extent
that it supplies less than its obligation, it loses the energy price, just
as in a contract for differences. Hence, the supplier has the same
marginal incentives as if it had not sold a hedge. If the supplier is
able to shift its output to higher-priced hours, it will be rewarded.
Because such shifting is rewarded, the option has no effect on
performance incentives, but acts only to hedge load and suppliers.
Performance incentives come from the spot market, as they should,
and are not affected by the hedge.
An advantage of the hedge is that it reduces the incentive to
exercise market power during times of scarcity. This is because
suppliers have effectively sold forward energy covering 100% of
load during times of scarcity. The forward sale improves the
performance of the spot energy market during scarcity periods,
which is exactly when the market is most vulnerable to market
power. Additionally, the hedge reduces supplier risk by removing
the energy rents above the scarcity price, which tend to have high
variance, and by including them in the ﬁrm energy payment, which
does notvarywithweatherorotherfactorsoutside of the supplier’s
control.
The auction design includes fail-safe mechanisms that deter-
mine what happens in the unlikely event that there is inadequate
supply offered in the auction, or there is insufﬁcient competition.
The auction design facilitates an active secondary market for the
ﬁrm energy product. Although the primary auction is intended to
procure all or nearly all of the target quantity, the purchase occurs
several years in advance and circumstances may change. Thus, on
an annual basis reconﬁguration auctions are held as needed, so that
suppliers and demanders can balance their positions for each
commitment year that has yet to occur. The reconﬁguration auction
is a sealed-bid clearing price auction. Sellers submit offers and
buyers submit bids, and a uniform clearing price is determined.
Every electricity market requires sufﬁcient capacity and energy
to reliably satisfy load. In Colombia, we focus on ﬁrm energydthe
ability to generate electricity in dry periodsdbecause that is the
reliability constraint that is currently binding in Colombia. Today
there is roughly 13 GW of capacity to service the annual peak of
about 8 GW. There is a 5 GW or 62% surplus of capacity. Given this
surplus, it is clear that the market price for capacity is zero. Firm
energydthe ability togenerateenergy in severedry periodsdis the
scarce resource, and that is what consumers should pay for. By
contrast, in the electricity markets in the thermal-dominated U.S.
markets, the reliability constraint is having enough capacity to
handle the annual peak, so the focus there is on capacity.
In some markets it may be unclear whether capacity or ﬁrm
energy is the scarce resource. The auction can accommodate scar-
city of both ﬁrm energy and capacity. The extension is simple. The
only change is introducing a second product, capacity. As before
suppliers offer resources and each resource is a package of both
ﬁrm energy and capacity. The market identiﬁes the collection of
resources that satisfy both the ﬁrm energy and capacity constraints
at minimum cost. This is done in the descending-clock auction as
before, but now there are two products and so two prices. In each
round, the auctioneer names a pair of prices (pE,p C), a price for ﬁrm
energyand a price forcapacity. Each supplier thendecides whether,
given the pairof prices, the supplier wishes to offer its resource. The
auctioneer then determines the aggregate supply of both ﬁrm
energy and capacity. If there is excess supply of a product, the
auctioneer reduces its price, unless the price is already zero. This
process continues until there is no longer excess supply of any
product with a positive price. The auctioneer’s goal in adjusting
prices is to ﬁnd the market equilibrium where supply and demand
balance for all products with positive prices.
3. Medium-term: forward energy market
We now turn to the forward energy market, which is a medium-
term market in which demanders and suppliers can lock in energy
prices and quantities for one to three years. Again we focus on the
forward energy market recently adopted in Colombia (Cramton,
2007).
3 In New England, the auction is conducted approximately three years in advance
of the commitment period and new resources lock in a capacity price for up to ﬁve
years.
4 See Ausubel and Cramton (2004) for a general analysis of clock auctions and
Ausubel and Cramton (in this issue) for a more detailed discussion of ascending-
clock auctions in electricity markets.
L.M. Ausubel, P. Cramton / Utilities Policy 18 (2010) 195e200 197Author's personal copy
As in most electricity markets, the vast majority of Colombia’s
energy is settled according to energy contracts with terms that are
much longer than the hourly spot market. Energy contracts often
have durations of one or two years, and sometimes more. These
energy contracts beneﬁt both suppliers and demanders. Both sides
of the market are able to lock in a price, and thereby reduce price
risk from the more volatile spot market.
Unfortunately, the existing energy contracting market has high
transaction costs, as a result of non-standard contracts, poor price
formation, localized contracting, lack of transparency, and other
factors. Evidence of a problem is seen in the frequent occurrence of
higher contract prices for regulated customers compared with
nonregulated customers, which is unexplained by load shapes,
credit risks, and other factors. The forward energy market, which
begins in 2010, is intended to address the existing problems in the
informal bilateral contracting market.
The forward energy market is an organized market to procure
energy for electricity customers on a forward basis. It includes the
regulated customers (residential and other small customers) and
optionally the nonregulated (large) customers. Currently, regulated
customers represent 68% of the total electricity demand and
nonregulatedcustomers represent the remaining 32%. Thedesign is
novel in allowing nonregulated customers to participate. Although
the regulated and nonregulated energy products remain distinct,
their integration into a single market facilitates arbitrage between
the products, improves liquidity, and reduces transaction costs.
Both regulated and nonregulated customers beneﬁt from this
uniﬁed approach.
Regulated customers are small customers withouthourly meters;
nonregulatedcustomersarelargecustomerswithhourlymeters.The
nonregulated product makes use of hourly meters to encourage
demand response. In addition, due to their large size, nonregulated
customersareactivebuyersintheforwardenergymarket,submitting
demand bids. In contrast, the regulated customers have a more
limited demand response capability and are not active buyers in the
forward energy auctiondtheir demands are set administratively.
The market is based on two products, a regulated product and
a nonregulated product. Both products are standard ﬁnancial
contracts: take-or-pay (ﬁxed quantity) energy contracts for 1 MWh
per day and have a commitment period of one calendar year. The
nonregulatedproducthasaﬂatloadshape.Theregulatedproducthas
the shape of historical regulated load, appropriately discounted for
Saturdays (10%) and Sundays and holidays (15%). For the regulated
product,eachsupplierbidstoserveitsdesiredquantityofColombia’s
regulated load. The supplier is paid the clearing price for every MWh





pesos; or US$120/MWh); see Cramton and Stoft (2007).
The distribution companies purchase one-hundred percent of
the expected regulated load on behalf of the regulated customers in
a sequence of auctions. Thus, the forward energy market together
with the ﬁrm energy market provides nearly 100% price coverage
for the expected load of regulated customers. The forward energy
market provides price coverage from zero to the scarcity price, and
the ﬁrm energy market provides price coverage above the scarcity
price. This accomplishes two things: 1) it provides rate stability for
regulated customers, and 2) it provides revenue stability for
suppliers. The result is reduced risk for both sides of the market.
Price risk only remains to the extent actual demand differs from
expected demand.
The goal is to have a regulated load shape (and discounts for
Saturday, Sunday, and holidays) such that the purchase of the target
quantity results in the smallest cumulative deviations over the year
between actual demand and contracted demand for each hour over
the year. This will provide the best hedge from volatile spot prices.
For countries with substantial load variation due to weather or
season, the regulated product would need to account for season
and weather to better match actual load.
Basing the product on expected demand, rather than actual
demand, has an important advantage going forward as real-time
meters become available at the consumer level. The distribution
companycan include consumercontracts that hedgeexpected load,
but reward the consumer for curtailing demand when spot prices
are high. With the take-or-pay contracts the distribution company,
and potentially the consumer, is exposed to the spot price on the
margin. This also shifts the burden of estimating demand to the
distribution company. Demand estimation should improve;
reduced errors in demand forecasts by the distribution company
will result in reduced exposure to spot prices.
The nonregulated product is a compromise emphasizing
simplicity. It has a potential downside in that it does not make any
attempt to follow the load shape of nonregulated customers. As
a result, the product is an imperfect hedge, which may create
market power problems in the spot market. If customers purchased
a quantity sufﬁcient to cover expected demand over the year, then
customers wouldpredictablyﬁnd themselveswith a spot surplus in
off-peak periods and a spot deﬁcit in peak periods. In the spot
market, the customers would be selling when the price is low and
buying when the price is high, resulting in positive deviation
payments. In contrast, suppliers would be buying when the price is
low (off-peak) and selling when the price is high (peak). Suppliers
would have strengthened incentives to increase the within day
variation in prices through the exercise of market power in the spot
market.
Customers with variable demands will ﬁnd the ﬂat demand
product less attractive. These customers may ﬁnd the ﬂat product is
an inadequate hedge, and so may contract separately for load
following (take-and-pay) contracts. Still the ﬂat product provides
a partial hedge and remains a possibility for all nonregulated
customers.
From a supplier’s point of view, the ﬂat demand is attractive,
especially for suppliers with less ﬂexible resources. Suppliers with
more ﬂexible resources still may bid aggressively for the nonreg-
ulated product, anticipating the positive deviation payments they
are apt to receive by shifting output to the peak hours.
Accommodating different load shapes for nonregulated
customers would make the market much more complicated. The
ﬂat product is an attractive compromise provided market power
concerns are not too important and provided nonregulated load is
sufﬁciently ﬂat that the product is attractive to most nonregulated
customers.
Since the nonregulated market is voluntary, customers do have
the option of limiting purchases of the ﬂat product if they ﬁnd it
unattractive. In addition to bilateral forward contracts, customers
can also use demand management to protect against supplier
market power in the spot market.
The prior approach of bilateral contracts suffers from three
problems. Price risk is greater since the contract cover often is
incomplete. Market power in both the spot market and the bilateral
market is more of a concern, since supplier positions are more apt
to be out of balance entering the spot market and competition for
bilaterals is weaker with specialized local products.5 The absence of
5 The greater transparency of the forward market facilitates the monitoring of
large suppliers who may attempt to acquire an imbalanced position to exercise
market power (Herrera Dappe, 2008).
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a standard contract also results in high transaction costs in addition
to weaker competition. By contrast, the new market provides
nearly full price coverage, suppliers likely enter the spot market
with more balanced positions, and the single product minimizes
transaction costs. In addition, the problem of self-dealing between
the load serving entity and its supplier afﬁliate is eliminated.
The market is mandatory for regulated customers, but voluntary
for suppliers. Mandatory participation on the demand side moti-
vates robust participation on the supply side.
The nonregulated customers enjoy similar beneﬁts as the
regulated customers from the forward energy market. The main
difference is that the nonregulated customers actively bid in the
forward energy market, and thus decide how much contract cover
to purchase and in which auction. The voluntary participation of
nonregulated customers provides a useful competitive check in the
market. If a nonregulated customer prefers different contracts, the
customer can contract separately. Also nonregulated customers can
arbitrage between the forward and spot energy markets.
The nonregulated product promotes rate stability. The product
provides a substantial hedge, yet still exposes the customer to the
spot price on the margin, motivating demand response.
There are a number of possible choices for the timing and
frequency of auctions, and the duration of contracts. These three
elements can be adjusted to manage price and credit risk, while
minimizing transaction costs. Ultimately, Colombia decided on
a calendar-year product purchased in a sequence of four to six
auctions conducted one to two years ahead. The approach is simple
and yet provides good time diversiﬁcation, shielding customers
from transient events. One-quarter to one-sixth of regulated load is
purchased in each auction. At any one time, the customer rate
reﬂects the average of four to six auctions equally spaced over
a one-year period, one to two years ahead.
6 Even the auction with
the shortest planning period occurs more than twelve months
before the start of the contract. This means that the auction price
will be set before there is much resolution of how severe conditions
will be in the dry season of the commitment year, reducing risk and
improving rate stability. Also with a one-year contract, the cost of
guarantees to assure performance are less.
The proposed forward energy market complements the other
keyelements of the Colombian market: the spot energy market and
the ﬁrm energy market. Combined, the forward energy market and
the ﬁrm energy market provide substantial price coverage. Notonly
does this reduce risk for both sides of the market, it puts suppliers
in a more balanced position in the spot energy market. As a result,
incentives to exercise market power are greatly mitigated in the
spot market. This improves the price signal in the spot market,
since a supplier in a balanced position has an incentive to offer its
true marginal cost.
Efﬁcient price formation is one of the most important objectives
of the forward energy market. The simultaneous descending-clock
auction is well suited to promote efﬁcient price formation. The
descending-clock auction provides excellent price discovery and
enables suppliers to freely arbitrage across the regulated and
nonregulated products. This assures that any price difference
between the two products is a reﬂection of cost differences.
With just two products, there is a simple and powerful method
that allows suppliers to express anylinear substitution between the
regulated and the nonregulated products (Cramton, 2007). This is
desirable, since the products are close substitutes. In the
descending-clock auction, each supplier expresses the total
quantity it wishes to supply (both regulated and nonregulated) at
a particular regulated price. The supplier also bids two price
spreads. The higher price spread indicates the price spread (regu-
lated price minus nonregulated price) above which the supplier
supplies only nonregulated product; the lower price spread indi-
cates the price spread below which the supplier supplies only
regulated product; for intermediate spreads, the supplier is
assumed to supply both products in proportion to how close the
price spread is to the lower or upper price spreads. Each round the
price spread is set to equalize excess supply in percentage terms
across the two products.
The integration of the regulated and nonregulated markets can
be expected to lead to greater liquidity, improved price formation,
and lower transaction costs. Our view is that the forward energy
market as proposed here will dramatically improve the energy
contract market for both regulated and nonregulated customers,
and improve the spot market as well, since suppliers typically will
enter the spot market with a more balanced position, reducing
incentives to exercise market power.
Since participation for nonregulated customers is voluntary, the
organized forward market faces important competition from the
bilateral market.
4. Conclusion
Forward markets can greatly improve the performance of
wholesale electricity markets byaddressing the critical problems of
risk, market power, and investment. Colombia recently adopted
both a long-term investment market (the ﬁrm energy market) and
a medium-term market for forward energy.
Early capacity markets suffered from serious ﬂaws that ulti-
mately led to their elimination or replacement. The ﬁrm energy
market designpresented here corrects each of the principal ﬂaws of
earlier capacity markets. In particular:
1. The product is deﬁned as a physically-backed call option on
energy. The physical requirement assures adequate resources.
The call option improves the performance of the spot energy
market in times of scarcity and reduces supplier risk.
2. New entry is coordinated by holding the auction well in
advance of the commitment period. This mitigates the
boomebust cycle that is common in electricity markets. More
importantly, it allows the ﬁrm energy price to be more directly
tied to the cost of new entry.
3. Strong performance incentives are maintained from the spot
energy price. Additional incentives come from the link, espe-
cially for thermal resources, between historical performance
and the level of ﬁrm energy certiﬁcation.
4. Price formation is supported by minimizing the ability of
existing suppliers to exercise market power in the ﬁrm energy
market. In addition, the descending-clock auction format
encourages price discovery and improves the efﬁciency of the
auction outcome.
A successful ﬁrm energy market depends on more than good
design. First, the ﬁrm energy market has at its foundation the spot
energy market. It is important that the spot energy market send
reliable price signals. Second, the ﬁrm energy market relies on
competitive entry; hence, entry barriers must be kept to
a minimum. And ﬁnally, the ﬁrm energy market depends on long-
run price expectations; thus, it is important that investors have
faith in the stability of the market over the long run.
Colombia’s forward energy market promises to reduce trans-
action costs and enhance competition for regulated and nonregu-
lated customers.
6 When supply is procured over a sequence of auctions, some monitoring of the
market by the regulator is important to assure that large suppliers do not bid to
enhance market power in the sequence of auctions (Herrera Dappe, 2009).
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The market is based upon two ﬁnancial products, one for regu-
lated customers and one for nonregulated customers. Suppliers bid
to supply a quantity of the regulated load and a quantity of the
nonregulated loaddaggregated across all load serving entities. This
simple approach enhances liquidity and competition, since all
suppliers are competing for and trading in the same two products.
Since regulated customers are procuring 100% of the expected
regulated load, these customers are nearly fully-hedged from the
spot price. Similarly, suppliers are able to lock in a long-term price
to stabilize their revenues.
Including nonregulated customers in the centralized market has
two important advantages. First, substitution between the regu-
latedand nonregulatedproducts assures that both customerclasses
pay market-based rates for electricity. And second, the demand
response of nonregulated customers in the forward energy market
helps protect both nonregulated and regulated customers from
supplier market power, and reduces the importance of the regu-
lated demand curve in determining prices. Competition among
suppliers and the competitive choices of the nonregulated
customers determine the auction clearing prices.
The forward energy products are fully consistent with, and
indeed complementary to,the otherkeyelements in the Colombian
market: the spot energy market and the ﬁrm energy market. The
ﬁrm energy market together with the forward energy market put
suppliers in a more balanced position in the spot market. Not only
does this reduce risk for both sides of the market, it greatly miti-
gates incentives to exercise market power in the spot market. Thus,
we anticipate that the forward energy market will not only reduce
problems in the bilateral contracting market, but will improve the
performance of the spot energy market. Both the electricity
industry and its customers will beneﬁt from these markets.
Efﬁcient price formation is one of the most important objectives
of the forward energy market. The simultaneous descending-clock
auction is well suited to generate efﬁcient price formation. The
descending-clock auction provides excellent price discovery and
enables suppliers to freely arbitrage across the regulated and
nonregulated products. This assures that any price difference
between the two products is a reﬂection of cost differences.
Our view is that Colombia’s two forward markets support both
the short-run and long-run efﬁciency goals of the wholesale
market. The forward markets effectively address the key problems
of risk, market power, and investment.
Some may view these forward markets as excessive central
planning. We contend that the alternative of incomplete markets
may be more dangerous, at least while demand-side market fail-
ures remain severe. The California electricity crisis of 2000e2001
demonstrates the importance of addressing risk, market power,
and investment. The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008e2009 demon-
strates the importance of doing so with transparent markets that
trade economically-sensible products.
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